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ABSTRACT
We provide a new legal perspective for the antitrust analysis of margin squeeze
conducts. Building on recent economic analysis, we explain why margin squeeze
conducts should solely be evaluated under adjusted predatory pricing standards.
The adjustment corresponds to an increase in the cost benchmark used in the
predatory pricing test by including opportunity costs due to missed upstream
sales. This can reduce both the risks of false positives and false negatives in
margin squeeze cases. We justify this approach by explaining why classic argu-
ments against above-cost predatory pricing typically do not hold in vertical struc-
tures where margin squeezes take place and by presenting case law evidence
supporting this adjustment. Our approach can help to reconcile the divergent
U.S. and EU antitrust stances on margin squeeze.
JEL: K21; L12; L43
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, margin squeeze (or price squeeze)1 allegations have fea-
tured high in the enforcement practice of regulatory and competition authorities,
especially in the telecommunications sector and other newly liberalized network
industries such as gas, electricity, and postal services.2 Case law has also evolved
signiﬁcantly in both the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU).
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Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, for hosting us for this research project.
1 “Price squeeze” is the term most commonly used by courts and commentators in the United
States and “margin squeeze” in Europe. The terms will be used interchangeably.
2 See OECD, MARGIN SQUEEZE DAF/COMP(2009)36 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/regreform/
sectors/46048803.pdf (providing a survey of margin squeeze cases in 25 jurisdictions). The most
recent example relates to the European Commission imposing a ﬁne of almost €70 million on
Slovak Telekom and its parent company, Deutsche Telekom, for margin squeeze and refusal to
deal between 2005 and 2010 in the Slovak market for broadband services. See also European
Commission, MEMO/14/590, Antitrust: Commission Decision on Abusive Conduct on Slovak
Broadband Markets by Slovak Telekom and Deutsche Telekom—Frequently Asked Questions,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-590_en.htm.
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However, a signiﬁcant divergence exists between these two jurisdictions with
respect to the criteria for assessing a margin squeeze conduct.3 This is reﬂected
in the two different approaches the U.S. and EU courts have developed for the
antitrust analysis of margin squeeze: the regulatory approach and the competi-
tion law approach, respectively.4
According to the U.S. regulatory approach, margin squeezes that are not
caught by refusal to deal or predatory pricing antitrust laws should be dealt
with by regulatory authorities only, relying on the economic principles of
access pricing.5 This view has been adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
linkLine.6 In contrast, according to the competition law approach, margin
squeeze should qualify as a standalone abuse of dominance by focusing on the
spread between wholesale and retail prices, and not on the lawfulness of each
price level.7 This position has been embraced by the European Courts,8 which
have ruled that it is not necessary to establish in addition that either the
3 See George A. Hay & Kathryn McMahon, The Diverging Approach to Price Squeezes in the United
States and Europe, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 259 (2012); John B. Meisel, The Law and
Economics of Margin Squeezes in the US Versus the EU, 8 EUR. COMPETITION J. 383 (2012).
4 See Damien Geradin & Robert O’Donoghue, The Concurrent Application of Competition Law and
Regulation: The Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector, 1 J. COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 355 (2005).
5 See J. Gregory Sidak, Abolishing Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 J. COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 279 (2008). Closely related to the regulatory approach to margin squeeze are
expertise-based arguments and the superiority of regulators in addressing competition issues
within the areas of their expertise when compared to competition law enforcers. See Erik
N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, The Viability of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, 51 ARIZ.
L. REV. 273 (2009).
6 Paciﬁc Bell Tel. Co. v linkLine Commc’ns, Inc. (linkLine), 555 U.S. 438 (2009). The Supreme
Court examined independently the lawfulness of the upstream and downstream prices of the
incumbent and held that in the absence of an upstream duty to deal on the upstream market and
lack of predatory prices at the retail market, the incumbent “is certainly not required to price
both of these services in a manner that preserves its rivals’ proﬁt margins.” Id. at 1119. Note that
the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant did not have a duty to deal because it had never
voluntarily engaged in selling at the wholesale level (absent regulation).
7 See Alberto Heimler, Is a Margin Squeeze an Antitrust or a Regulatory Violation, 6 J. COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 879 (2010).
8 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n (Deutsche Telekom 2010), 2010 E.C.R.
I-09555; Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB (TeliaSonera), 2011 E.C.
R. I-00527; Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica & Telefónica de España v. Comm’n (Telefónica 2014),
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2062 (July 10, 2014). Note that the EU Courts approach
contrasts with that of the Common Position of the European Regulators Group and the
European Commission on remedies under the new regulatory framework for electronic
communications which viewed margin squeeze as an anticompetitive effect that can be the result
of different behaviors such as price discrimination upstream and/or predatory pricing
downstream. See European Regulators Group, Revised ERG Common Position on the
Approach to Appropriate Remedies in the ECNS regulatory framework (May 2006), ERG (06)
33, 38. Traces of the EU approach to margin squeeze abuses can be found in the U.S. in the
Alcoa decision of the 2nd Circuit. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945).
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wholesale or retail price is, independently of the claimed squeeze, excessive.9
Under the EU competition law approach, the sole issue that should be deter-
mined is whether the spread between the retail prices charged by a dominant
undertaking and the wholesale prices it charges its competitors for comparable
services is negative or insufﬁcient to cover the product-speciﬁc costs of the
dominant operator for providing its own retail services in the downstream
market.10 As we shall see, following TeliaSonera,11 such insufﬁcient spread
could either mean that the competitor could be able “to operate at the retail
market only at a loss or at artiﬁcially reduced levels of proﬁtability.”12
Of course, the divergence that exists between the U.S. and the EU with
respect to margin squeeze owes much to the institutional differences that exist
between these two jurisdictions as well as to political economy considera-
tions.13 For example, the forum of U.S. antitrust law is primarily the courts,
while EU competition law decisions are taken by administrative agencies.
These differences in the institutional structure of antitrust enforcement have
some bearing on how courts have regulated the relationship between competi-
tion law and regulation. Furthermore, unlike the U.S., most EU Member
states have very strong incumbents in utilities markets, most of which were
state-owned. This may explain the inclusion of positive margins by the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the grounds that the Court wants
to avoid margin squeeze that aims at blocking the expansion of competitors at
the retail level.14 Finally, in the telecommunications sector, the EU competi-
tion law approach to margin squeeze seems to complement ex ante regulation,
and in particular, by the “ladder of investment” approach applied in Local
Loop Unbundling (LLU) regulation.15 Aiming to balance static with dynamic
efﬁciency considerations, this approach is based on the idea that the regulator
9 See e.g., Deutsche Telekom 2010, 2010 E.C.R. I-09555 ¶ 183; TeliaSonera, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527
¶ 34, 99.
10 Commission Decision of 21 May 2003 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 82 of the EC
Treaty (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579—Deutsche Telekom AG) (Deutsche Telekom
2003), 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9, ¶ 107; Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n (Deutsche
Telekom 2008), 2008 E.C.R. II-477 ¶ 167;Deutsche Telekom 2010, 2010 E.C.R. I-09555 ¶ 159.
11 TeliaSonera, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527.
12 Id. ¶ 33.
13 See e.g., Daniel A. Crane, linkLine’s Institutional Suspicions, 2008–2009 CATO SUPREME
COURT REV. 111 (2009); John Vickers, Competition Policy and Property Rights, 120 ECON. J. 375
(2010).
14 See Part II.
15 See, e.g., Martin Cave & Ingo Vogelsang, How Access Pricing and Entry Interact, 27 TELECOMM.
POL’Y 717 (2003); Martin Cave, Encouraging Infrastructure Competition via the Ladder of
Investment, 30 TELECOMM. POL’Y 223 (2006). Note, however, that the “ladder of investment”
approach has mixed theoretical implications, and has led to weak empirical results, as shown,
respectively, by Marc Bourreau & Joeffrey Drouard, Progressive Entry and the Incentives to Invest
in Alternative Infrastructures, 45 J. REG. ECON. 329 (2014); Maya Bacache, Marc Bourreau &
Germain Gaudin, Dynamic Entry and Investment in New Infrastructures: Empirical Evidence from
the Fixed Broadband Industry, 44 REV. INDUS. ORG. 179 (2014).
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should encourage access to wholesale markets by setting very low access prices
for the network elements that are too expensive for the new entrant to duplicate.
Regulatory prices are increased as soon as new entrants are able to consolidate
their market position and thus able to move up “the ladder of investment.”
Hence, one may argue that the regulatory approach of the “ladder of invest-
ment” underlies the European “theory of harm,” in the sense that incumbents
engage in margin squeeze conduct to prevent rivals from competing in greater
parts of the supply chain. Such “dynamic rationale” is, however, absent in the
U.S. This is because the stringent unbundling rules enacted in the wake of the
U.S. Telecommunications Act 1996 so as to facilitate rapid market entry of
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs),16 have been progressively phased
out since 2005 due to concerns raised on their impact on investment incen-
tives.17 The focus, however, of this article is on competition policy, and not on
the issues that arise in ex ante regulation.18 Therefore, while we acknowledge the
abovementioned institutional and substantive considerations, our aim here is
not to explore these further, but rather to highlight the enforcement-related
issues that may arise from the abovementioned diverging approaches to margin
squeeze.
Both approaches raise potentially problematic issues. On the one hand, the
regulatory approach may give rise to false negative errors (under-deterrence),
as it invites the question whether a margin squeeze which harms competition
through prices that, nonetheless, respect the standard Courts’ deﬁnitions of
predatory pricing and refusal to deal could still be punished by Courts as antic-
ompetitive conduct.19 On the other hand, the competition law approach may
give rise to false positive errors (over-deterrence) because of its broad deﬁn-
ition of margin squeeze, which may also include situations where the competi-
tor’s downstream costs do not exceed the difference between downstream and
upstream prices. As a result, dominant ﬁrms could be prevented from en-
gaging in procompetitive conducts that lower consumer price and increase
16 The Telecommunications Act constitutes one of the numerous amendments to the
Communications Act 1934, the governing statute for the regulation of all sectors of the
telecommunications industry in the U.S. The mandatory unbundling provisions are enshrined
in Section 251(d) of the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56, codiﬁed at 47 U.S.C. § 151 and were implemented by Implementation of the Local
Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11
FCC. Rcd. 15,499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P &F) 844–49 (1996).
17 See, e.g., Jerry A Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve its Purpose?
Empirical Evidence from Five Countries, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 173 (2005).
18 See Germain Gaudin & Claudia Saavedra, Ex Ante Margin Squeeze Tests in the
Telecommunications Industry: What Is a Reasonably Efﬁcient Operator?, 38 TELECOMM. POL’Y 157
(2014) (analyzing ex ante treatment of margin squeeze by European regulatory authorities).
19 See Nicholas Economides, Vertical Leverage and the Sacriﬁce Principle: Why the Supreme Court
Got Trinko Wrong, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 379 (2005) (arguing inter alia that the
examination of each price level separately for evidence of a discrete abuse fails to take into
account of the dominant ﬁrm’s ability to engage in vertical leveraging); Heimler, supra note 7.
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total surplus. Indeed, because of the so-called “umbrella effect,”20 a dominant
ﬁrm would face a de facto price ﬂoor at the retail level once the wholesale price
is set, if squeeze is too broadly deﬁned and punished by law.
In this paper, we suggest a different approach in order to overcome the
abovementioned shortcomings. This approach consists of evaluating margin
squeeze conducts solely under adjusted predatory pricing standards. By
adjusted predatory standards we mean: (1) the inclusion of opportunity costs
in a price-cost comparison test that are easily identiﬁable in the case of vertical-
ly related markets, and (2) an assessment of an exclusionary strategy. The ar-
gument is structured as follows. First, we explain why in markets where there
is an upstream duty to deal enforced by Courts,21 a variation of standard
Courts’ deﬁnition of predatory pricing by way of including opportunity costs
in the price-cost comparison test would sufﬁce to identify any margin squeeze.
Then, we build on recent economic analyses of margin squeeze conducts in
order to identify their different effects. In doing so, we explain why margin
squeezes which may harm competition resemble predatory pricing strategies,
and why other types of margin squeeze typically would harm competitors, but
not competition. We show why classic arguments against the use of above-cost
predatory pricing test typically do not hold in vertically related markets where
margin squeeze takes place. Finally, building on the case law, we also provide
groundings for the Courts to use this approach. We believe that this novel
20 SeeDennis W. Carlton, Should “Price Squeeze” be a Recognized Form of Anticompetitive Conduct?,
4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 271 (2008); Sidak, supra note 5.
21 While the classic U.S. duty to deal doctrine was established in United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300 (1919), subsequent Supreme Court decisions in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Ski Corp. (Aspen Skiing), 472 U.S. 585 (1985) and Verizon Comm’ns v. Law
Ofﬁces of Curtis v. Trinko (Trinko), 540 U.S. 398 (2004) have signiﬁcantly reduced the
circumstances where a duty to deal will be established under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
particularly in regulated industries and/or where there has been no prior course of dealing. In
Aspen Skiing, the Court ruled that a monopoly ﬁrm has a duty not to exclude rivals by a refusal
to deal unless there are “valid business reasons for the refusal.” Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 597.
The monopolist, Aspen Skiing, voluntarily sold the product and then stopped selling it and
discriminated against rivals. This fact was treated by the Court as a basis for inferring
anticompetitive intent (the discontinuation by Aspen Skiing “suggested a willingness to forsake
short-term proﬁts to achieve an anticompetitive end.”) Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. The Supreme
Court in Trinko reconceived Aspen as an exception to the broader rule that monopoly ﬁrms may
unilaterally refuse to deal with competitors. The Court distinguished Trinko from Aspen Skiing
as, unlike the latter case, the monopolist Verizon did not voluntarily sell the product (that is, the
leased UNEs) and then ceased selling them or discriminated against rivals. Instead, the market
for leased UNEs was created by regulation. This led the Supreme Court to assert that Aspen
Skiing was already “at or near the outer boundary of Section 2 liability.” Trinko, 540 U.S. at
409. In the EU, a regulatory duty to deal can be enforced under competition laws by
competition authorities and courts, as the presence of ex ante regulation does not prevent the
application of an ex post duty to deal. See Commission Decision of 21 May 2003 Relating to a
Proceeding Under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579—
Deutsche Telekom AG) (Deutsche Telekom 2003), 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9; Deutsche Telekom 2010,
2010 E.C.R. I-09555.
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approach to margin squeeze could reconcile the two opposing transatlantic
views on the conduct.
Relying on adjusted-predatory pricing standards to evaluate margin squeeze
conducts presents three main beneﬁts. The ﬁrst one is that it furnishes a
simple, reliable price-cost test to identify margin squeeze conducts as anticom-
petitive or monopolizing. This, in turn, improves legal certainty. Furthermore,
it presents the advantage of implementation in both the U.S. and the EU. The
second one relates to the fact that the suggested approach allows for the detec-
tion of monopolizing margin squeeze conducts which would pass a standard
predatory pricing test, where opportunity costs are omitted. It does so while
avoiding classic problems related to above-cost predatory pricing standards
(for example, administrability and predictability of the rule), because it
restricts the use of such standards to vertically related markets. This, in turn,
reduces the risk of under-deterrence. Finally, the suggested approach relies on
the predatory pricing requirement that the alleged conduct should lead to the
actual or likely exclusion or marginalization of competitors from the market.22
Hence, it provides a safe harbor for margin squeezes which harm competitors,
by reducing their proﬁts, but not competition (because competitors remain in
the market) and which lower prices for consumers. This, in turn, reduces the
risk of over-deterrence.
Before proceeding, an important caveat should be noted here. There is a
long-standing academic and policy debate—especially in the EU context—on
whether margin squeeze should be recognized as a distinct, stand-alone cat-
egory of abuse of dominance or whether it should be treated in an “equivalent
fashion” to other established forms of abuse, such as refusal to deal and preda-
tory pricing.23 Mindful of the controversy surrounding the nature and treat-
ment of margin squeeze abuse, our aim here is not to engage in a normative
discussion on this issue. We are, therefore, not concerned with whether
margin squeeze should be treated in an analogous fashion to refusal to deal24
(which would, among others, entail relying on an anticompetitive foreclosure
22 See Case C-209/10, Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet (Post Danmark), 2012 E.C.R.
I-0000 ¶ 22 (“Competition on the merits may, by deﬁnition, lead to the departure from the
market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efﬁcient and so less attractive to
consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or
innovation.”).
23 The literature on the issue is vast. In the U.S. context, see Heimler, supra note 7; Carlton, supra
note 20. In the EU context, see Liam Colley & Sebastian Burnside, Margin Squeeze Abuse, 2
EUR. COMPETITION J. 185 (2006); Alison Jones, Identifying an Identifying an Unlawful Margin
Squeeze: The Recent Judgments of the Court of Justice in Deutsche Telekom and TeliaSonera, 13
CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. L. STUD. 161 (2010); OECD, supra note 2; David Spector, Some
Economics of Margin Squeeze, 1 CONCURRENCES 21 (2008).
24 The European Commission, for example, in its Guidance on Article 102 document, appears to
establish a parallel between the margin squeeze doctrine and that of refusal to deal. See
European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying
Article 82 [Article 102] of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant
Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, ¶ 69 [hereinafter Guidance on Article 102].
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test) or to predatory pricing (which would entail relying on a proﬁt sacriﬁce
test). On the contrary, we take a positive approach to the issue, as our sug-
gested test builds on the prevailing treatment of margin squeeze in the U.S.
and the EU. In light of the above, our ambition is much narrower and critical:
to argue that margin squeeze cases should face the abovementioned two-fold
test.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Part II, we summar-
ize the current state of antitrust analysis of both predatory pricing and margin
squeeze in the U.S. and the EU. In Part III, we propose an above-cost preda-
tory pricing approach to antitrust analysis of margin squeeze, and in Part IV we
discuss this approach in light of the literature and case law on above-cost
predatory pricing. Part V concludes.
II. PREDATORY PRICING ANDMARGIN SQUEEZE: WHERE DO
WE STAND?
This Part provides a brief account of current antitrust approaches to predatory
pricing and margin squeeze in the U.S. and the EU. We consider both types of
abuses because our proposed approach to margin squeeze, detailed in Part III
below, builds on current U.S. and EU approaches to predatory pricing. Our
aim is to highlight the ﬂaws of the existing antitrust treatment of margin
squeeze and to demonstrate that the structural transatlantic differences are
larger in the case of margin squeeze than in that of predatory pricing.
A. Predatory Pricing
Predatory pricing is inherently a dynamic strategy typically taking place in a
single market, whereby a ﬁrm incurs a sacriﬁce in the short run to exclude
competitors, in order to acquire a dominant position allowing it to recoup its
losses and earn supracompetitive proﬁts in the long run.25 This pattern of
sacriﬁce-then-recoupment is found in the case law as well.
While the U.S. and the EU courts seem to agree on the abovementioned
mechanism that leads to predation, they nonetheless disagree on the formula-
tion of the legal rule that should be applied. Hence, the legal rules adopted re-
spectively in the U.S. and the EU for the assessment of predation differ
substantially. Brieﬂy, in the EU the test for predation requires an assessment of
(1) the dominant ﬁrm’s ex ante perspective of whether the conduct is likely to
25 There are several existing theories of predation which explain how the dominant ﬁrm could
earn its position allowing for recoupment by forcing competitors to exit the market (for
example, signal jamming, ﬁnancial predation with imperfect ﬁnancial markets, and reputation).
See, e.g., MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 415–22
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). However, the European Commission notes that a dominant
position can be acquired without exclusion of competitors, if the sacriﬁce phase led to
disciplining the market. SeeGuidance on Article 102, supra note 24, ¶ 69.
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lead to a sacriﬁce and (2) whether this is likely to lead to actual or likely antic-
ompetitive foreclosure. In the U.S., the antitrust plaintiff must demonstrate
both sacriﬁce (in the sense of sales below cost) and a market structure condu-
cive to recoupment. In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Brooke
Group26 case—the landmark case on predatory pricing—the successful plain-
tiff should prove that there is a “dangerous probability” that the predator
would recoup its investment in below cost prices.27 In sharp contrast to the
U.S. approach, the EU Courts do not require recoupment as a prerequisite in
predatory pricing cases.28 However, this does not mean that the likelihood of
recoupment is completely irrelevant. Rather, it seems implicit in the notion of
dominant position; in other words, that a dominant ﬁrm having disciplined or
excluded its rivals from the market, will be able to raise prices and recoup loses
made during the predatory period and harm consumers.29 The Commission
in its 2005 Discussion Paper came to a similar conclusion noting that “as dom-
inance is already established this normally means that entry barriers are sufﬁ-
ciently high to presume the possibility to recoup.”30 However, a degree of
caution should be applied to such a statement, because dominance can be
deﬁned according to different thresholds of market shares, which, in turn, may
affect the ability of the dominant ﬁrm to recoup its losses.
Despite the abovementioned differences, both in the U.S. and the EU, the
Areeda-Turner rule has proved extremely inﬂuential on assessing the sacriﬁce
requirement.31 Areeda and Turner sought to formulate a cost-based price test
as a workable test for distinguishing between predatory pricing and competitive
26 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corp. (Brooke Group), 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
27 Id. The Supreme Court conﬁrmed this position in the linkLine case and in Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007). See alsoMatsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US 574, 590–91 (1986). For a discussion of the
difﬁculties associated with recoupment, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 370 (West Group 2005).
28 For the most recent pronouncement on recoupment, see Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom SA
v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.R. I-2369. For a criticism of the EU approach to recoupment, seeMichal
Gal, Below-Cost Price Alignment: Meeting or Beating Competition?, 28 EUR. COMPETITION L.
REV. 382 (2007). Advocate General Nial Fennelly and Ján Mazák have argued in favor of
incorporating recoupment in the legal test for predation. In Compagnie Maritime Belge, AG
Fennely suggested that some form of recoupment “should be part of the test for abusive low
pricing by dominant undertakings.” See Opinion of AG Fennelly in Joined Cases C-395/96P
and 396/96P, Compagnie Maritime Belge NV & Dafna Lines v. Comm’n, 1998 E.C.R. I-1365
¶ 136; Opinion of AG Mazák in Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom SA v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.
R. I-02369 ¶ 59–60. For the opposite view, see Cyril Ritter, Does the Law of Predatory Pricing and
Cross-Subsidization Need a Radical Rethink?, 27 WORLD COMPETITION 613 (2004).
29 To this effect, see John Temple Lang & Robert O’Donoghue, Deﬁning Legitimate Competition:
How to Clarify Pricing Abuses Under Article 82EC, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 83 (2002).
30 European Commission, Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to
Exclusionary Abuses, 2005, ¶ 122, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/others/
discpaper2005.pdf.
31 See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 88 HARVARD L. REV. 697 (1975).
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pricing. They proposed to consider predatory a price that falls below short run
marginal cost and argued that such a simple test would capture conduct that
was likely to exclude equally efﬁcient ﬁrms from the market. However, ac-
knowledging the difﬁculties associated with calculating marginal cost, they
suggested relying instead on average variable cost (AVC) as a convenient proxy
for enforcement.32 Hence, under the Areeda-Turner rule prices are presumed
unlawful when they are set below AVC.
The case law supports the Areeda-Turner approach of a price-cost test to
assess sacriﬁce. In the U.S., the Supreme Court in Brooke Group33 established
that a successful plaintiff must prove that the alleged prices fell below an appro-
priate measure of cost. The Court, however, declined to “resolve the conﬂict
among the lower courts over the appropriate measure of costs,”34 despite the
fact that the parties had relied on the AVC as the relevant measure of cost.
Nonetheless, subsequent case law conﬁrms that AVC is generally considered
to be the appropriate standard.35
In the EU, Courts have considered the Areeda-Turner test as a starting
point, but they have introduced some important modiﬁcations. Hence, the
legal test established in the AKZO36 case and reﬁned in Tetra Pak II37 deﬁnes
as anticompetitive prices below AVC, and also prices above AVC, but below
average total cost (ATC) “if they are determined as part of a plan for eliminat-
ing a competitor.”38 In the former case, foreclosure is implied by the dominant
ﬁrm’s pricing strategy, which would typically prove irrational if it were not for
excluding competitors. In other words, the AKZO ruling sets out a presump-
tion that there is no proﬁt-maximizing reason for pricing below costs.39 In the
latter case, however, establishing anticompetitive foreclosure becomes import-
ant. As the Commission puts it, a dominant undertaking engages in predatory
pricing “so as to foreclose or be likely to foreclose one or more of its actual or
potential competitors.”40 Therefore, the notion of foreclosure is central to
32 Id. at 716–18.
33 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corp. (Brooke Group), 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
34 Id. at 222.
35 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Areeda-Turner Test for Exclusionary Pricing: A Critical Journal, 46 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 209 (2015) (noting that “every federal circuit except the Eleventh has embraced
some variation of the test that Areeda and Turner proposed.”).
36 Case C-62/86, AKZOChemie BV v. Comm’n (AZKO), 1991 E.C.R. I-3359.
37 Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak Int’l SA v Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. II-755 aff’d, C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak
Int’l SA v. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. I-5951.
38 AKZO, 1991 E.C.R.-I-3359 ¶ 72. Note that the AKZO requirements for lawful pricing are thus
stricter than the Areeda-Turner test, as under the AKZO test there can be predation when
prices are above AVC.
39 However, prices below AVC may be part of a pricing plan for new products or can occur in
two-sided markets. See Guidance on Article 102, supra note 24, ¶ 26 n.3. In this regard, AKZO
only sets out a presumption of anticompetitive conduct. Circumstances such as these referred
to in the Guidance paper could thus be recognized and the presumption rebutted.
40 SeeGuidance on Article 102, supra note 24, ¶ 63.
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predatory pricing strategies, and this is clearly shown in the case law.41 In this
regard, predatory pricing antitrust cases typically involve exclusion (or likeli-
hood of) actual competitors or foreclosure of potential competitors, which
could serve the market if they were to enter. In economic theory, however, a
distinction exists between the use of low pricing strategies to exclude competi-
tors (predatory pricing) and to deter entry of rivals (“limit pricing,” whereby a
dominant ﬁrm charges less than its short run proﬁt-maximizing price in order
to deter entry).
B. Margin Squeeze
In contrast to predatory pricing, margin squeeze is a conduct that can only
arise in vertically related markets, where a vertically integrated ﬁrm, dominant
at the upstream level, faces competition in the downstream segment from com-
petitors who rely on its upstream input. According to the EU Courts and au-
thorities,42 a margin squeeze occurs when the spread between the price
charged to competitors upstream and the price charged to the dominant
undertaking’s own customers downstream is either negative or insufﬁcient for
competitors as efﬁcient as the dominant undertaking to cover their speciﬁc
downstream costs. Hence, a margin squeeze occurs when the as-efﬁcient
competitor (AEC) test fails. This test compares the integrated ﬁrm’s retail
41 See, e.g., AKZO, 1991 E.C.R.-I-3359 ¶ 41–42; Case T-340/03, France Télécom SA
v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-117 ¶ 130.
42 Commission Decision of 21 May 2003 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 82 of the EC
Treaty (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579—Deutsche Telekom AG) (Deutsche Telekom
2003), 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9, ¶ 102, 140; Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n
(Deutsche Telekom 2008), 2008 E.C.R. II-477 ¶ 237; Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG
v. Comm’n (Deutsche Telekom 2010), 2010 E.C.R. I-09555 ¶ 177; European Commission,
Summary of Commission Decision of 4 July 2007 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 82 of
the EC Treaty (Case COMP/38.784—Wanadoo España v. Telefónica), 2008 O.J. (C 83) 6, ¶ 312
(Telefónica); Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica & Telefónica de España v. Comm’n (Telefónica
2014), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2062, ¶ 75 (July 10, 2014). See also the Commission’s
adoption of interim measures in Napier Brown v. British Sugar, Case No. IV/30.178 Napier
Brown/British Sugar (Napier Brown 1988), 1988 O.J. (L284/41). The Commission explicitly
held that the existence of a margin squeeze should be tested on the basis of the dominant ﬁrm’s
charges and costs and that it is necessary to show that the margin is “insufﬁcient to reﬂect the
dominant company’s own costs and transformation…with the result that competition in the
derived product is restricted.” Id. ¶ 66. See also Case T-5/97, Industrie des Poudres Sphériques SA
v Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. II-3755 ¶ 179. The most authoritative discussion of the appropriate
test for margin squeeze stems from the CJEU’s preliminary ruling in TeliaSonera. The CJEU
acknowledges that in principle the test should be whether the dominant ﬁrm “would have been
sufﬁciently efﬁcient to offer its retail services to end users otherwise that at a loss if it had ﬁrst
been obliged to pay wholesale prices for the intermediary services” that is whether the margin
passes the AEC test. Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB (TeliaSonera),
2011 E.C.R. I-00527 ¶ 32, 41, 42. The Court however did not clearly reject the Reasonably
Efﬁcient Competitor (REC) test and established three scenarios where it might be relevant to
apply it. See id. ¶ 45.
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price, p, to its upstream price, a, and its own downstream costs, c, and is
satisﬁed when p a + c.43
Such an approach is consistent with general welfare considerations (in so
far as it protects competition in the form of as or more efﬁcient competitors as
opposed to less efﬁcient ones) and is also consistent with the principle of legal
certainty, as it is based on the integrated ﬁrm’s own prices and costs.44
Hence, in the EU, margin squeeze is recognized as a freestanding violation of
Article 102 TFEU subjected to the as-efﬁcient competitor test.45 In the
TeliaSonera judgement, the CJEU clariﬁed that the Oscar Bronner require-
ments do not need to be satisﬁed in order to establish margin squeeze liabil-
ity.46 Refusal to supply and margin squeeze are thus treated as two distinct
infringements, with the latter requiring a less demanding test. The Court,
instead, held that when a dominant ﬁrm ﬁxes the “terms of trade” with its
downstream competitors, it might be found to abuse its dominant position,
when the terms of dealing are “disadvantageous” for the new entrants.47
Indispensability of the wholesale input is not, therefore, required for liability,
although it “might be relevant” when assessing the effects of the margin
squeeze.48 In the absence of the abovementioned conditions, however, it is
43 The AEC test is also referred to as the “imputation test.”
44 See Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n (Deutsche Telekom 2008), 2008 E.C.R.
II-477 ¶ 167–68, 192, 200–03; TeliaSonera, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527 ¶ 41–48; Case C-295/12 P,
Telefónica & Telefónica de España v. Comm’n (Telefónica 2014), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 2062 (July 10, 2014) ¶ 124.
45 See supra note 9.
46 TeliaSonera, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527, ¶ 54–58. In Oscar Bronner, the CJEU spelled out three
conditions that must be met before a refusal to supply an input by the dominant ﬁrm can be
considered abusive: (1) the refusal must be likely to eliminate all competition in the secondary
market on the part of the person requesting access; (2) there is no objective justiﬁcation for the
refusal; and (3) the service in itself is indispensable to carrying on that person’s business,
inasmuch as there is no actual or potential substitute in existence. Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner
GmbH & Co. v. MediaprintZeitungs und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co., 1998 E.C.R.
I-7791 ¶ 41); see also Guidance on Article 102, supra note 24, ¶ 80, where the conditions that
must be met for the establishment of a refusal to deal or margin squeeze set out by the
Commission are essentially identical to those established by the CJEU in Bronner.
47 TeliaSonera, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527, ¶ 54. The Court diverged from the opinion of Advocate
General Mazák, who had argued that absent a duty to deal, either imposed by sector speciﬁc
regulation or because the Oscar Bronner conditions were satisﬁed, there is “no independent
competitive harm caused by the margin squeeze above and beyond the harm which would
result from a duty to deal violation at the wholesale level.” Opinion of AG Mazák in
TeliaSonera, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527 ¶ 11–20; see also Damien Geradin, Refusal to Supply and
Margin Squeeze: A Discussion of Why The ‘Telefonica Exceptions’ Are Wrong (Tilec Discussion
Paper, Paper No. 2011-009, 2011).
48 TeliaSonera, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527 ¶ 69, 70–71 (“[W]hen access to the wholesale input is
indispensable potential anticompetitive effects are probable.”). For a criticism of this approach,
see Hendrik Auf’mkolk, The ‘Feedback Effect’ of Applying EU Competition Law to Regulated
Industries: Doctrinal Contamination in the Case of Margin Squeeze, 1 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. &
PRAC. 1 (2012).
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necessary to demonstrate that the existence of the squeeze makes market
penetration more difﬁcult for competitors.49
An important remark is that, under EU laws, there is no direct need to
prove competitor foreclosure in order to substantiate a margin squeeze claim,
as long as one shows potential anticompetitive effects of the pricing conduct;
as these effects are necessary in order to qualify the pricing practice as an abuse
of dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.50 As further
explained in TeliaSonera, a squeeze exists when an AEC operates in the market
“at a loss or at artiﬁcially reduced levels of proﬁtability.”51 While the potential-
ly exclusionary effect of the pricing practice is “probable”52 in the case of a
negative margin (that is, when the wholesale price is higher than the dominant
ﬁrm’s retail price), in the case of a positive margin it must be demonstrated
that that the conduct is “likely to have the consequence that it would be at least
more difﬁcult for the operators concerned to trade on the market con-
cerned.”53 This can be put in perspective with the two-fold AKZO standard
for predatory pricing mentioned above, whereby prices below AVC are pre-
sumed predatory, and prices between AVC and ATC are punished only if they
form part of an exclusionary strategy. As will be shown in Part III.B, the assess-
ment of the exclusionary effect of a price squeeze with positive margin is neces-
sary in order to distinguish between subcategories of margin squeeze, which
have different effects on competition and consumer welfare.
In stark contrast, in the U.S. margin squeeze does not constitute a standa-
lone violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court’s decision
in linkLine has eliminated the possibility—that existed since the Alcoa deci-
sion54—of maintaining an independent margin squeeze action, if there is no
antitrust duty to deal. The primary reason for rejecting the pricing spread
concept appears to be administrative concerns.55 Margin squeezing behavior
must instead be assessed as a constructive refusal to deal56 or as an instance of
49 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n (Deutsche Telekom 2010), 2010 E.C.R.
I-09555.
50 See TeliaSonera, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527 ¶ 27, 61.
51 Id. ¶ 33.
52 Id. ¶ 73.
53 Id. ¶ 74; see also Nicola Petit, Price Squeezes with Positive Margins in EU Competition Law:
Anatomy of an Economic and Legal Zombie, 2 REVUE DU DROIT DES INDUSTRIES DE RESAU 123
(2014) (commenting on the inconsistency between the anticompetitiveness of a positive margin
squeeze as in the TeliaSonera judgment and the subsequent Post Danmark judgment).
54 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
55 The Court ruled that “[i]nstitutional concerns” counsel against adopting a stand-alone price
squeeze theory. Paciﬁc Bell Tel. Co. v linkLine Commc’ns, Inc. (linkLine), 555 U.S. 438,
1120–21 (2009). The Court emphasized in particular the difﬁculty that exists of administering
a rule that would require judges “to police” both retail and wholesale prices and ensure that the
“interaction” between them does not “squeeze” rival ﬁrms, and the elusiveness in trying to
apply a requirement that a monopolist leave its rivals a “fair” or “adequate”margin. Id.
56 That is, under the standards developed in Trinko.
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predatory pricing.57 An unfair or inadequate margin itself is not illegal. It im-
portant to stress, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on
margin squeeze, when there exists a duty to deal enforced under antitrust laws;
precisely the case we study in this paper.58
Finally, in the case of margin squeezes that arise in regulated sectors, in the
EU the presence of sector-speciﬁc regulation does not prevent the application
of competition law and the margin squeeze concept, provided that the vertical-
ly integrated ﬁrm retained some scope to avoid the squeeze even if it can only
do so by raising retail prices.59 By contrast, in the U.S., the presence of sector-
speciﬁc regulation excludes the application of antitrust to the price levels that
comprise the squeeze.60
While margin squeeze conducts are assessed in different ways in the U.S.
and the EU, this part showed that alleged predatory pricing conducts are eval-
uated according to more similar approaches. In other words, they both follow
the sacriﬁce-then-recoupment framework elaborated in the economics litera-
ture, even though some differences remain in practice. With this in mind, the
following section will provide an alternative approach to the antitrust assess-
ment of margin squeeze—the above-cost predatory pricing standard for
margin squeeze conduct—which may reconcile the transatlantic differences
with respect to this conduct.
III. AN ABOVE-COST PREDATORY PRICING APPROACHTOMARGIN
SQUEEZE
Prior to introducing our approach to assessing margin squeeze conduct, it is
important to note that we focus on conducts that arise in industries where the
integrated ﬁrm faces a duty to deal61 that is enforced by courts. That is, either
an antitrust or a regulatory duty to deal in Europe62 or an antitrust duty to deal
57 That is, under the standards developed in Brooke Group.
58 SeeHeimler, supra note 7.
59 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n (Deutsche Telekom 2010), 2010 E.C.R.
I-09555 ¶ 181–82.
60 See linkLine, 555 U.S. 438.
61 The duty to deal might be either a non-excessive price or a rule prescribing the integrated ﬁrm
to supply its rivals or not discriminate against its rivals. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Ski Corp. (Aspen Skiing), 472 U.S. 585 (1985), where the defendant refused to sell
at duopoly prices to a competitor. Id.
62 See, e.g., Deutsche Telekom 2010, supra note 8; Napier Brown v. British Sugar, Case No. IV/
30.178 Napier Brown/British Sugar (Napier Brown 1988), 1988 O.J. (L284/41), where both an
abusive refusal to supply and a margin squeeze were found; Case T-5/97, Industrie des Poudres
Sphériques v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. II-3755, which conﬁrmed the Commission’s
non-infringement decision as alternative sources of supply were available and the alleged
margin squeeze was rejected.
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in the U.S.63 This allows us to consider cases in which both the EU and the
U.S. courts could potentially intervene.
A. New Standard for Margin Squeeze Conducts
Our approach is summarized in an above-cost predatory pricing standard for
margin squeeze conducts. Such a standard builds on the assessments of preda-
tory pricing conducts, while taking into account the speciﬁcities of the vertical
structure in which a margin squeeze takes place. Its goal is to reduce both risks
of under- and over-deterrence as compared to current approaches, while being
administrable.
Our standard requires the following: (1) a comparative test of the dominant
ﬁrm’s prices and costs, including opportunity costs of missed upstream sales; and
(2) an assessment of an exclusionary strategy, as in the case of predatory pricing.
Our suggested standard to margin squeeze conduct may reduce the risks of
under-deterrence under U.S. laws64 and over-deterrence under EU laws. With
respect to the former, taking into account the opportunity costs of missed up-
stream sales when assessing whether prices are below some measure of costs
enables to detect dominant undertakings’ anticompetitive or monopolizing
conducts in cases where both wholesale and retail prices are set at such levels
that escape the refusal to deal or predatory pricing laws respectively. With
respect to the latter, the requirement that the conduct is exclusionary (in the
sense of impeding an actual competitor who served consumers from doing so
and deterring entry of a competitor who would serve consumers) may restrict
the scope of potential liability of a margin squeeze under EU laws, as allowed
in TeliaSonera. The beneﬁt of this narrower deﬁnition is that it does not
prevent dominant ﬁrms from engaging in proconsumer price cutting, which
would allow more-efﬁcient competitors to remain in the market, albeit making
a lower, positive proﬁt.
Overall, our approach only focuses on anticompetitive and monopolizing
margin squeeze conducts. We refer to such conducts as those where the in-
cumbent sets a retail price at such levels that do not allow a competitor who is
at least as efﬁcient as the incumbent at the retail level and who would serve the
retail market absent a squeeze, to earn positive proﬁts.
63 See supra note 21. The Court in Trinko did not make unilateral refusals to deal legal per se; it
held that freedom to deal is paramount and that the facts of Aspen Skiing must be treated as an
exception to this principle. Verizon Comm’ns v. Law Ofﬁces of Curtis v. Trinko (Trinko), 540
U.S. 398 (2004); see also Howard Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation,
109 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2011) 698–99; Eleanor Fox, Is There Life in Aspen After Trinko? The
Silent Revolution of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 153, 168 (2006).
64 Whereas the Supreme Court has yet to state on assessing a margin squeeze conduct when there
is an antitrust duty to deal, it explained that the AEC test “lacks any grounding in [its] antitrust
jurisprudence.” See linkLine, 555 U.S. at 1121–22; Heimler, supra note 7. This leaves the door
open to under-deterrence under an antitrust duty to deal in case the Supreme Court does not
recognize that a monopolizing strategy can occur with above-cost prices.
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In the following sections we explain in greater detail the suggested two-
prong test of margin squeeze conduct, and why it performs better than current
approaches. Finally, we discuss its administrability.
B. Opportunity Costs of Missed Upstream Sales
As already discussed, a convenient way to detect all margin squeezes is the
“as-efﬁcient competitor” (AEC) test. An important observation is that the def-
inition of margin squeeze according to the AEC test includes both refusal to
deal and predatory pricing as subcases of margin squeeze conduct, as both too
high an input price and too low (that is, below cost) a retail price can induce a
margin squeeze. However, this deﬁnition may also capture some conducts that
do not correspond to refusal to deal or to predatory pricing practices, where
the vertically integrated ﬁrm may earn a positive proﬁt while applying a margin
squeeze to monopolize the market.65 Therefore, standard Courts’ criteria for
assessing refusal to deal or predatory pricing practices, which include inter alia
a below-cost requirement (such that the dominant, integrated ﬁrm incurs
losses in the short run) would not encompass this speciﬁc case of margin
squeeze.
To illustrate the under-deterrence problem under the current U.S. ap-
proach, consider the following example. An incumbent telecommunications
ﬁrm owns a residential access network, which costs $5 per month and per con-
sumer line to maintain. It must grant access to the network to a downstream
competitor at a (maximum) price of $10 because of a duty to deal.66 The
incumbent’s retail cost is $20 per month per consumer, whereas the competi-
tor is more efﬁcient, with a retail cost of $18. The competitor needs to rent one
access line for each of its customers.
Following a standard predatory pricing test, the incumbent is allowed to set
its retail price at any level equal to or above $25 per month—the sum of its up-
stream and downstream costs. However, the competitor cannot set a price
lower than $28 without making a loss. Therefore, the incumbent may force its
competitor to exit the market while respecting standard predatory pricing laws
by setting a price between $25 and $28, and then beneﬁt from a dominant
65 This type of conduct corresponds to what Herbert Hovenkamp calls “long-run
anticompetitive” pricing strategies, in that it is “sustainable” in the long run, as the dominant
ﬁrm earns a positive proﬁt. PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 736 (2d ed. Aspen Pub.
2002).
66 A wholesale price set through a duty to deal can be above cost if the incumbent has to be
compensated, for example, for investment in Universal Service Obligations. See, e.g., Heimler,
supra note 7. By contrast, when the upstream price is set at the level of the upstream cost by the
duty to deal—that is, $5 in our example—then all margin squeeze conducts would be detected
by both the classic and adjusted predatory pricing tests, which would be equivalent. See, e.g.,
Jan Bouckaert & Frank Verboven, Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment, 26 J. REG. ECON.
321 (2004).
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position (for example, due to barriers to entry) downstream and recoup its
losses.67 In doing so, the incumbent would only earn between $0 and $3 per
month per consumer in the short run, as compared to $5 in the case where it
would not squeeze its competitor. However, it could then increase its retail
price in the long run to recoup this foregone proﬁt, once the competitor has
left the market. Consumers would likely be worse off due to the monopoliza-
tion, as follows from standard predatory pricing strategies.
This above-cost predatory strategy is not possible when we take into
account the opportunity cost of a missed upstream sale in the cost calculations
for the predatory pricing test. The opportunity cost is what the incumbent
foregoes (one upstream sale) when it decides to serve the retail market itself; in
our example, this corresponds to the difference between network access price,
and cost, that is, $5. This represents the “sacriﬁce” the incumbent bears in the
short-run when engaging in a margin squeeze. Following the AEC test, the in-
cumbent cannot set a retail price below $30. Therefore, the competitor, who is
the most efﬁcient downstream ﬁrm, can serve the retail market at a price
between $28 and $30.
As several scholars have already observed,68 including the opportunity cost
that the dominant, vertically integrated ﬁrm incurs by a missed sale at the up-
stream level in the (marginal cost-based) Areeda-Turner test is equivalent to
the AEC test for margin squeeze.69 The beneﬁt of presenting this test as one
for predatory pricing is that it could be endorsed by U.S. Courts, even after
linkLine.
Several scholars have argued in favor of including opportunity costs in pre-
dation cases.70 For instance, Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp support
the inclusion of opportunity costs in predatory pricing tests under the
67 Several theories of predatory pricing, building on dynamic sacriﬁce-then-recoupment
strategies, provide arguments for why the incumbent could ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to
monopolize the market than to serve its competitor and why the competitor could not sustain a
price war when it makes a negative proﬁt. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, A
Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 93
(1990); MOTTA, supra note 25.
68 See, e.g., Heimler, supra note 7; Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey & Claudia Saavedra, The Economics
of Margin Squeeze (CEPR Paper No. DP9905, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2444927.
69 To see why this is the case, consider the (marginal cost-based) Areeda-Turner test for a
vertically integrated ﬁrm with upstream and downstream marginal costs, cu and c, respectively,
which faces a downstream competitor buying its input and selling homogeneous retail
products. The integrated ﬁrm has to set its retail price p such that, p  cu + c. However, by
undercutting its competitor’s retail price, it misses an upstream sale at price a, and, thus, an
upstream proﬁt of a – cu. If we include this opportunity cost in the above-mentioned test, it
becomes: p  (a – cu) + cu + c, which simpliﬁes into the as-efﬁcient imputation test, p  a + c.
70 It is important to note that the debate over above-cost predatory pricing has always been quite
vivid among legal scholars and economists. In Part IV below, we review the different arguments
on this topic and we explain why the traditional pitfalls of above-cost predatory pricing
standards typically do not apply to vertically related markets were margin squeeze conducts take
place.
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following two conditions: ﬁrst that such opportunity costs are easily identiﬁ-
able and second that their inclusion does not lead to punishing a ﬁrm for a
“failure to maximize” its proﬁts in the short run.71 In the context of a margin
squeeze conduct, favoring a downstream sale instead of a short-run proﬁt
maximizing upstream sale can usually be said to fall in the range of easily iden-
tiﬁable opportunity costs, as it is deﬁned by the duty to deal.
C. Exclusionary Efffects
In this Part, we elaborate on the second prong of our test. We show how the as-
sessment of (the likelihood of) foreclosure of competitors in margin squeeze
cases could reduce the risk of over-deterrence.
Recent economic analyses of margin squeeze conduct show that it may have
different effects on competition, competitors and consumers. For example,
Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, and Claudia Saavedra,72 argue that the deﬁnition
of margin squeeze in light of the AEC test encompasses two different types of
conduct: exclusionary and exploitative margin squeezes. The ﬁrst type of
conduct, that of an exclusionary margin squeeze, occurs when the integrated ﬁrm
sets both its upstream and downstream prices at such levels that a downstream
competitor that is at least as efﬁcient as the integrated ﬁrm cannot proﬁtably
remain in the market. There are several dynamic reasons why an integrated
ﬁrm would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to engage in such conduct. First, it may undertake
a predatory-like pricing strategy, leading to the exclusion of competitors at a
sacriﬁce in the short run, in order to beneﬁt from a dominant position at the
downstream level in the long-run, thereby allowing for sacriﬁce recoupment.
Several existing theories of predation can explain how the integrated ﬁrm
could force downstream competitors to exit the market—for example, signal
jamming, ﬁnancial predation with imperfect ﬁnancial markets, and reputa-
tion.73 The second explanation why an integrated ﬁrm would ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to engage in an exclusionary margin squeeze conduct is provided by other fore-
closure theories, which may hold irrespective of whether a duty to deal exists.
Just like predation theories, these foreclosure theories also build on short-run
sacriﬁce and supracompetitive proﬁt (that is, recoupment) following the
71 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ch. 7C-3 (Aspen Pub. 2008); see also Hovenkamp, The
Areeda-Turner Test for Exclusionary Pricing, supra note 35, at 13–14; William J. Baumol,
Predatory Pricing and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39 J.L. & ECON. 49, 50, 69–71
(1996).
72 Jullien, Rey & Saavedra, supra note 68.
73 See MOTTA, supra note 25 (providing a review of predatory pricing theories). In vertically
related markets, these theories of predatory pricing can occur at a price that is above the
integrated ﬁrm’s marginal cost of production. See Gary Biglaiser & Patrick DeGraba,
Downstream Integration by a Bottleneck Input Supplier Whose Regulated Wholesale Prices Are Above
Costs, 32 RAND J. ECON. 302 (2001) (offering an example following the deep-pocket theory of
predatory pricing).
Margin Squeeze: An Above Cost Predatory Pricing Approach 167
 by guest on M
arch 19, 2016
http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
exclusion of competitors. One example of such a theory is that of monopoly
maintenance, whereby the dominant ﬁrm forecloses the downstream market in
the short run in order to prevent entry into the upstream market in the long
run.74
It is important to highlight that in all the abovementioned economic theor-
ies of foreclosure, the notion of sacriﬁce is similar to that of predatory pricing,
as long as the downstream prey is at least as efﬁcient as the integrated ﬁrm. In
fact, in this latter case, according to the Chicago School argument, the inte-
grated ﬁrm would be better off in the short run when selling only at the up-
stream level and allowing its more-efﬁcient competitor to resell to ﬁnal
consumers. Therefore, by engaging in an exclusionary conduct, the integrated
ﬁrm incurs losses or foregoes proﬁts during the squeeze period, as the retail
proﬁts earned by serving the retail market alone are smaller than those that it
could have obtained by selling at the upstream level. The exclusionary conduct
can be proﬁtable because the integrated ﬁrm’s pricing conduct may be con-
strained by the upstream duty to deal, hence preventing it from fully extracting
surplus introduced by downstream ﬁrms and offering it incentives to monopol-
ize the downstream market.75
The second type of conduct Jullien, Rey, and Saavedra identify, that of an
exploitative margin squeeze, occurs when the integrated ﬁrm sets its prices at
such levels that allow it to capture the surplus introduced by a more efﬁcient
entrant, which remains in the market. In fact, the integrated ﬁrm’s prices may
be set at such levels that impede a hypothetical as efﬁcient competitor from
earning a positive proﬁt, but allow an existing more efﬁcient competitor, with
lower costs, to do so. As explained by the Chicago School’s “single monopoly
proﬁt theory,” the integrated ﬁrm has no incentives to exclude a more efﬁcient
downstream competitor other than for predatory and foreclosure motives men-
tioned above, as long as it is able to capture the rent arising from its competi-
tor’s superior technology. Nonetheless, even in this case it can still apply a
margin squeeze by setting a low retail price its competitor will have to undercut
74 See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and
Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 134 (2002); Yongmin Chen,
Refusal to Deal, Intellectual Property Rights, and Antitrust, 30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 533 (2014). One
could conjecture that, according to a related theory, an exploitative margin squeeze leading to
the marginalization (rather than the exclusion) of competitors may also hamper long-run
upstream competition, while maintain downstream competition. We are not aware, however, of
any theory work along those lines. Moreover, as explained in the introduction, dynamic
efﬁciency considerations are typically dealt with by regulatory authorities through ex ante tools
rather than by ex post competition policy.
75 As our analysis involves an integrated ﬁrm that faces an upstream duty to deal, the result of the
Chicago School’s Single Monopoly Proﬁt Theory, according to which the integrated ﬁrm
would have no incentive to force downstream entrants to exit the market, may not apply. This
reasoning relates the well-known Bell doctrine. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell
Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 1249 (1999).
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in order to serve the market, hence increasing demand and capturing the proﬁts
through its upstream price.76 In the case of an exploitative margin squeeze there
is no exclusion of the rival from the downstream market. In fact, in the event of
the competitor exiting the market, the integrated ﬁrm will end up earning a lower
proﬁt due to the fact that it will no longer be able to capture its surplus rent.
Therefore, exploitative margin squeezes do not harm competition because the
most efﬁcient downstream ﬁrm always remains in the market. However, they
may not be “fair” to the competitor. This is because the integrated ﬁrm can lever-
age its—nonetheless constrained by the duty to deal—upstream market power
into the downstream market by applying a margin squeeze, hence capturing the
rent introduced by its rival’s technological advantage (that is, its lower cost).
Therefore, the latter does not fully beneﬁt from its cost advantage. In other
words, exploitative margin squeezes harm the competitor, but not competition,
as the most-efﬁcient ﬁrm remains in the market. Finally, they beneﬁt consumers
by inducing lower retail prices they would not have been in a position to enjoy
absent the pricing practice. By contrast, predatory margin squeezes, whereby
equally or more efﬁcient downstream competitors are excluded from the market,
may harm competition. Overall, from an economic perspective, only margin
squeezes that exclude competitors who are at least as efﬁcient as the integrated
ﬁrm would harm competition and lower total surplus.
The risk of over-deterrence, however, is serious under EU laws, because ex-
ploitative margin squeezes can be banned. As explained above, the CJEU has
explicitly stated that a margin squeeze occurs when a retail competitor operates
“at a loss or at artiﬁcially reduced levels of proﬁtability,” thereby deﬁning
“margin squeeze” as a conduct that could leave a downstream competitor with
a positive proﬁt.77 This is in stark contrast to predatory pricing, where foreclos-
ure (or likely foreclosure) of “actual or potential competitors”78 is required to
assess the conduct. Assessing (likelihood of) foreclosure of competitors in
margin squeeze cases would allow to distinguish between exploitative and ex-
clusionary conducts and thus would reduce the risk of over-deterrence. As a
result, an exploitative conduct, which allows the most-efﬁcient downstream
competitor to remain in the market and to serve ﬁnal consumers, should not
be prevented by competition laws because it brings larger total and consumer
surplus in the form of lower prices.79
76 In the game where the integrated ﬁrm and its competitor sell homogeneous products, there is a
continuum of equilibria in which the integrated ﬁrm constrains its competitor to proﬁtably
serve consumers at a price lower than the sum of the input price and its own downstream cost,
a + c. See, e.g., Carlton &Waldman, supra note 74.
77 See Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB (TeliaSonera), 2011 E.C.R.
I-00527 ¶ 33.
78 Guidance on Article 102, supra note 24, ¶ 63.
79 Note that in our examples there is a single downstream competitor to the dominant ﬁrm. If
several ﬁrms with different efﬁciencies compete in a homogenous market, then the distinction
between exploitative and exclusionary margin squeeze builds on whether the most efﬁcient
competitor—that is, the one serving the market—is foreclosed. Similarly, as long as the
Margin Squeeze: An Above Cost Predatory Pricing Approach 169
 by guest on M
arch 19, 2016
http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
In order to understand the risk of over-deterrence under EU laws, consider
the following example. As above, a telecommunications network incumbent
has upstream and downstream marginal costs of $5 and $20, respectively, and
faces a duty to deal at a wholesale price of $10. Its downstream competitor is
more efﬁcient, with a marginal cost of $18, but has to rent one access line per
retail customer. As explained above, the competitor must set a price above $28
in order to make a positive proﬁt. Therefore, the incumbent can set a retail
price of $29 without forcing its competitor to exit the market. The incumbent
typically has an incentive to put such pressure on its competitor’s retail price,
as this increases market demand and, therefore, its own upstream proﬁts.80
However, a strict application of the AEC test, as endorsed by the CJEU in
TeliaSonera, would set a price ﬂoor of $30 to the incumbent’s retail price. An
incumbent’s retail price of $29 thus corresponds to an exploitative margin
squeeze, and drives the retail market price down while avoiding any exclusion-
ary effect. Therefore, when there is no distinction made between exclusionary
and exploitative conducts and all margin squeezes are prohibited, a ban on
margin squeeze prevent some proconsumer effects. This corresponds to the
“umbrella effect.”
By contrast, following our approach, exclusionary effects of the conduct
constitute a prerequisite to detect anticompetitive or monopolizing margin
squeezes. Because a retail price of $29 is not exclusionary to the actual com-
petitor, nor to any potential competitor that could serve the retail market in
lieu of the actual one, it would not be prevented.
All in all, the presence of a notion of exclusion in the assessment of alleged
anticompetitive conducts is important in order to distinguish between exclu-
sionary and exploitative margin squeezes. It follows that, authorities and
courts should focus only on the former type of margin squeeze, which is poten-
tially anticompetitive in the sense that it hampers competition. Because this
notion is not always required in margin squeeze cases, but it does exist in
predatory pricing (or a proxy of it), at least under EU laws, we believe this
approach would help to prevent over-deterrence of proconsumer exploitative
margin squeezes.
most-efﬁcient competitor remains in a homogenous product market, a margin squeeze would
only deter entry of potential competitors. Such potential competitors, however, would not be
able to compete with the most-efﬁcient competitor, even though they could be more efﬁcient
than the dominant integrated ﬁrm at the downstream level.
80 From an economic perspective, one may notice that the incumbent’s price of $29 does not
correspond to a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, in this example with homogeneous
products and simultaneous retail pricing. This could easily be circumvented by allowing, for
instance, the incumbent to commit to its price before the entrant. For a discussion of margin
squeeze in differentiated markets. See Jullien, Rey & Saavedra, supra note 68, § 4.
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D. Administrability of the Rule
We assess the administrability of our suggested approach against the following
three criteria: (1) that it can adapt to current laws in both the U.S. and the EU;
(2) that it can provide ex ante legal certainty for the ﬁrms; (3) that it is simple
to use in the enforcement procedure.
With respect to the ﬁrst criterion, we argue that our approach can adapt to
the current legal framework in the two jurisdictions. Under EU laws, a retail
price below AVC is presumed predatory, in the sense that it implies exclusion
of competitors and a market structure allowing for recoupment. Similarly,
under our approach, a squeeze with a negative margin (that is, wholesale price
above retail price) is de facto exclusionary as it prevents any competitor to
remain or enter the market. In addition, the assessment of foreclosure effects
on the most efﬁcient competitor is important in the case of squeezes with posi-
tive margins, in order to punish exclusionary conducts only, and not exploit-
ative ones (under EU laws, recoupment is implied by the post-exclusion
market structure and it is not required to be demonstrated). By contrast, under
U.S. laws, our approach mimics that of assessing predatory pricing, but with
the important difference that the dominant ﬁrm’s retail price should be set
below some measure of costs, which include opportunity costs of missed up-
stream sales. Hence, relying on adjusted-predatory pricing standards to evalu-
ate margin squeeze does not alter the EU characterization of margin squeeze
as a “stand-alone” abuse, while it results to margin squeeze being treated as a
subcase of predatory pricing in the U.S.
Furthermore, our suggested price-cost test for margin squeeze is aligned
with the treatment of margin squeeze as a price-based exclusionary strategy, in
light of the European Commission’s classiﬁcation of price and non-price
related exclusionary abuses81 and the relevant case law.82
With respect to the second criterion, our approach promotes ex ante legal cer-
tainty for the ﬁrms in the sense that all test parameters—including the opportunity
81 Guidance on Article 102, supra note 24, ¶ 23–27. A consequence of this classiﬁcation is the
adoption of cost-based tests as ﬁlters for antitrust enforcement in the area of price-based
exclusionary conducts.
82 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n (Deutsche Telekom 2010), 2010 E.C.R.
I-09555 ¶ 198–99 (“[I]n order to assess whether the pricing practices of a dominant
undertaking are likely to eliminate a competitor contrary to Article 82 EC, it is necessary to
adopt a test based on the costs and the strategy of the dominant undertaking itself… a
dominant undertaking cannot drive from the market undertakings which are perhaps as
efﬁcient as the dominant undertaking but which, because of their smaller ﬁnancial resources,
are incapable of withstanding the competition waged against them.”); Case C-209/10, Post
Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet (Post Danmark), 2012 E.C.R. I-0000 ¶ 5 (“Thus, Article
[102 TFEU] prohibits a dominant undertaking from, among other things, adopting pricing
practices that have an exclusionary effect on competitors considered to be as efﬁcient as it is
itself and strengthening its dominant position by using methods other than those that are part of
competition on the merits. Accordingly, in that light, not all competition by means of price may
be regarded as legitimate.”).
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cost that is deﬁned by the duty to deal—are known to the ﬁrms. Hence, the sug-
gested test may inform the ﬁrms which pricing conducts will be infringement of
the law and which will not, before they make their pricing decisions.83
Finally, our approach should be relatively simple to use during the enforce-
ment procedure. It is a straightforward exercise to implement the two prongs of
the test and it does not require complex analysis or hypothetical economic assess-
ments regarding the opportunity cost when the integrated ﬁrm faces a duty to
deal and upstream prices are known to all parties. This is especially the case in
the context of regulated industries, where there exists a track record of cases and
longstanding experience in dealing with the pricing practices of the incumbent.
Probably, the most daunting aspect of our test is that it requires enforcers to take
into account opportunity costs ex post, that is, after the conduct has taken place.
This departs from the existing approach in competition proceedings whereby
opportunity costs are typically used ex ante in order to evaluate ﬁrm’s incentives.
This could sometimes prove challenging in non-regulated industries where the
upstream price—which corresponds to the opportunity cost—is not always
clearly deﬁned. This might explain the limited use of opportunity costs so far in
abuse cases, including predatory pricing cases, as we shall see in Part IV below.
IV. FURTHER SUPPORT TOAN ABOVE-COST PREDATORY PRICING
APPROACH
In this Part, we address several possible criticisms to our approach. The ﬁrst one
relates to the antitrust treatment of above-cost predatory pricing strategies. We
review the arguments against the use of above-cost predatory pricing tests and
we explain why these do not hold in vertically related markets where margin
squeezes take place. The second one relates to the limited institutional capacity
of the adjudicative process to consider opportunity costs. We explain why such
an approach could be administered by the courts by reviewing previous case law.
A. Above-Cost Predatory Pricing Standards in Vertically Related
Markets
There is a long-standing debate on whether above-cost price cuts should be
punished as predatory under antitrust laws.84 The two opposing views
83 The incumbent may not know the cost of its downstream competitors. It is, however, unlikely
that an incumbent involuntarily excludes an entrant from the downstream market while it was
trying to exploit its surplus through an exploitative margin squeeze. Indeed, an incumbent is
generally careful not to exclude its competitors when engaging in exploitative margin squeeze
conducts, as it beneﬁts from their presence in the downstream market and would earn less if
this market was monopolized.
84 See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J.
284 (1977); William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of
Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979); William J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic of the
Average Variable Cost Test, 39 J.L. & ECON. 49 (1996); Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley &
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generally rely on arguments related to under- and over-deterrence of monopol-
izing or anticompetitive pricing strategies. The analyses provided by Aaron
Edlin and Einer Elhauge help to summarize the state of the art of this debate.85
Edlin argues in favor of assessing above-cost price cuts as predatory under
some circumstances (for example, when the dominant incumbent engages in
substantial price cuts right after entry), whereas Elhauge takes the opposing
view and argues against such an assessment. Punishing pricing conducts that
are above-cost is not a simple task, because, as Elhauge puts it, one should
identify such a monopolizing or anticompetitive conduct “in a way antitrust
law can regulate without having unduly negative effects on other desirable
conduct.”86 In this section, we attempt to tackle this issue in the speciﬁc case
where a dominant ﬁrm owns an essential wholesale product and faces compe-
tition in a downstream market. In particular, we show that classic arguments in
favor of a de facto lawfulness of above-cost pricing cuts do not hold in vertically
related markets.
The ﬁrst type of arguments in favor of the lawfulness of above-cost pricing
reﬂects administrability concerns. As Carlton puts it, courts have determined
“that a legal rule that would purport to penalize only predatory above-cost
pricing would (1) be difﬁcult to administer; (2) be unpredictable in application
and therefore difﬁcult for businesses to follow; and (3) discourage proconsu-
mer price cutting.”87
Whereas we share the administrability concerns as the latter arise in the
general context of predatory pricing, our aim here is to show that the vertical
structure in which margin squeeze takes place allows overcoming such con-
cerns. This is owing to two reasons. First, above-cost predatory pricing, when
including opportunity costs due to missed upstream sales, is not particularly
difﬁcult to administer, nor unpredictable. In fact, the opportunity cost is easily
identiﬁed, as it corresponds to the upstream revenue the dominant ﬁrm fore-
goes when it engages in a margin squeeze and serves the retail market in lieu of
its competitor. The corresponding costs and upstream prices, over which there
is a duty to deal enforced by courts, are known to the dominant ﬁrm.
The last point raised by Carlton—that above-cost predatory pricing stan-
dards could discourage proconsumer price cutting—relates to the efﬁciency of
the competitive process. It is also one of Elhauge’s main arguments against
above-cost predatory pricing standards. He states that “the price ﬂoors, where
they have bite, will prevent the incumbent from adopting above-cost price cuts
Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239
(2000).
85 Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941 (2002); Einer
Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory—And the
Implications for Deﬁning Costs and Market Power, 122 YALE L.J. 681 (2003).
86 Elhauge, supra note 85, at 702.
87 Carlton, supra note 20, at 274.
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that lower prices as much as they otherwise would have” when competing with
more-efﬁcient entrants.88 However, as we explained in Part III, proconsumer
price cutting is typically not discouraged when assessing margin squeeze con-
ducts that involve an exclusionary strategy. This relates to Elhauge’s argument,
according to which only “variable costs of the alleged predatory increase in
output that displaces the rival’s output” should be considered.89 Indeed, a
focus on these costs, which correspond to diverting rival’s output (that is to an
exclusionary margin squeeze conduct) does not hamper the dominant’s ﬁrm
ability to engage in a proconsumer exploitative conduct in vertically related
markets.
Elhauge also mentions another argument related to efﬁciency motives when
explaining that an above-cost predatory pricing approach could favor entry of
less-efﬁcient competitors.90 However, according to our approach, these
entrants would be undercut by the incumbent in vertically-related markets (or
they would be unable to serve the market because of an existing more-efﬁcient
competitor), as the price ﬂoor set by the AEC test resulting from inclusion of
opportunity costs has no bite on less-efﬁcient entrants.91
Overall, the speciﬁcities of vertically related markets, in which margin
squeezes take place, help to address the main issues related to assessing and pun-
ishing anticompetitive or monopolizing above-cost predatory pricing conducts.
B. Case Law in Support
While the equivalence of the Areeda-Turner test and to the AEC test, when
one accounts for opportunity costs, is not a new topic,92 what has been under-
explored is whether this approach could be supported from a legal perspective.
This Part will discuss the cases where EU and U.S. courts and authorities con-
sidered opportunity costs.
1. U.S. Perspective
The main case supporting the use of opportunity costs is the 2005 U.S. Sixth
Circuit’s Spirit93 decision in the airline industry. In Spirit, the defendant
(Northwest) had allegedly both lowered its price and shifted additional cap-
acity (aircrafts) into targeted routes the plaintiff (Spirit) had just entered in
order to force the latter to exit these routes. The Court considered an
88 Elhauge, supra note 85, at 774.
89 Id. at 711–12.
90 Id. at 766–70.
91 Id. Elhauge himself recognizes this possibility, stating that “[d]epending on market
circumstances, it might be that the price ﬂoors… are below the price an unrestricted incumbent
would want to charge post-entry anyway. In those cases, though, the restrictions have no bite.”
Id. at 762 n. 219.
92 See, e.g., Jullien, Rey & Saavedra, supra note 68, at 20.
93 Spirit Airlines v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005).
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incremental version of the Brooke Group cost test94 and laid down two tests: (1) a
test based on whether total revenues exceeded total variable costs for all ﬂights on a
given route, and (2) a test that compared whether the incremental proﬁts that
resulted from the addition of capacity (aircraft) to certain routes exceeded the
incremental costs of adding this capacity. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in
U.S. v. American Airlines95 (AMR)—a case brought by the Department of Justice
pertaining to a similar factual situation with that of the Spirit case—also considered
an incremental version of the Brooke Group test.96 The defendant (AMR), which
was the dominant carrier with about 70 percent of the trafﬁc at the Dallas/Fort
Worth hub airport, when faced with competition on its routes by new entrants
lowered its own prices to match those of the new entrants and increased the
number of its own ﬂights on the same routes. When the new carrier abandoned its
routes, AMR raised its prices and returned to its pre-entry scheduled ﬂights. In
both of these cases the courts considered measures of opportunity cost instead of
accounting based measures of cost, as part of the incremental costs of expanding
output. While the use of such a measure of opportunity cost—that is, the oppor-
tunity costs deriving from the dominant carrier’s strategy to add additional capacity
(aircrafts) on the targeted routes, earning less during the predation period—had
been rejected by the Court in the AMR decision, the Spirit Court accepted
foregone revenues as part of the incremental costs of expanding output.97
It may be argued that the inclusion of concepts such as opportunity costs
reduce the administrability of the Brooke Group rule. Areeda and Hovenkamp
also stress that the use of opportunity cost can in theory send courts on “ill
deﬁned ﬁshing expeditions in search of hypothetical more proﬁtable investments
that a ﬁrm might have made.”98 However, they clarify that this criticism does
not apply in industries, such as airlines, where the shift of capacity in these cases
involves identiﬁable shifts of aircrafts from one market to another, hence making
calculation of the opportunity cost of foregone revenues feasible. Likewise, as
already discussed (Part III.B), in the case of margin squeeze conduct, favoring a
downstream sale instead of short-run proﬁt maximizing upstream sale typically
falls in the range of easily identiﬁable opportunity costs.
2. EU Perspective
In the EU, there has not yet been a judgment discussing the possible inclusion
of opportunity costs. The Commission’s 2009 Guidance document, however,
94 Id. at 938 (“Therefore, the assessment of predation compares the revenues (the price)
Northwest received from this tactic versus the incremental (or average variable cost)
Northwestern incurred from carrying those passengers.”).
95 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
96 Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph Farrell, “The American Airlines Case: A Chance to Clarify Predation
Policy,” in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION AND POLICY 502–27
(John E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds., 4th ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
97 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, at 304–11.
98 Id. at 309.
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does not seem to exclude such a possibility. The Commission does not link
the concept of sacriﬁce to a particular cost benchmark.99 It relies on the
average avoidable cost (AAC) as the starting point and refuses to compare the
“actual conduct with hypothetical or theoretical alternatives” that “taking into
account the market conditions and business realities facing the dominant
undertaking can realistically be expected to be more proﬁtable.”100 This para-
graph could be interpreted as allowing the consideration of opportunity costs,
but not in a way that would punish ﬁrms for failure to maximize their proﬁts.
While the inclusion of opportunity cost analysis remains quite embryonic in
the EU case law, a small number of European Commission decisions have
already taken opportunity costs into account. First, in the parallel Scandlines
and Sundbusserne decisions concerning allegedly exploitative pricing, the
Commission, for the ﬁrst time, elaborated on its own method of assessment of
unfairly high pricing, which included opportunity costs.101 There, the
Commission dismissed complaints brought by ferry companies (Scandlines
Sverige and Sundbusserne) of excessive and discriminatory port fees charged
by the Port of Helsingborg (HHAB). In particular, the ferry companies
claimed that HHAB was levying excessive and discriminatory charges for ser-
vices provided to ferry operators by treating the port as a single economic and
operational unit and that HHAB’s charges were not cost-based. To determine
the abuse, the Commission had to evaluate the twofold United Brands102 test:
(1) whether the price-cost margin was excessive (that is, whether the HHAB’s
port fees were excessive compares to the costs incurred by the port in providing
services and facilities to ferry operators on the Helsingborg-Elsinore route);
and (2) whether the price imposed was “either unfair in itself or when com-
pared to competing products.”103 The Commission, however, did not estab-
lish whether HHAB’s price-cost margin was excessive, because in assessing
the fairness of the price the Commission investigated whether the price
charged had a reasonable relation to the “economic value” of the service sup-
plied.104 In doing so, the Commission considered it necessary to take into
account not only the costs incurred by the port in providing its services, but
also additional costs, such as sunk costs and opportunity costs incurred by
99 Guidance on Article 102, supra note 24, ¶ 63–64.
100 Id. ¶ 65.
101 See Case COMP/A.36.568/D3, Scandlines Sverige AB v. Port of Helsingborg (Brussels, July
23, 2004), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_36568;
Case COMP/A.36.570/D3, Sundbusserne v. Port of Helsingborg (Brussels, July 23, 2004),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_36570. The ﬁrst
case was challenged before the General Court in Case T-399/04, Scandlines Sverige AB
v. Comm’n, 2005 O.J. (C6/40), and was subsequently closed.
102 Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Comm’n, 1978 E.C.R. 207.
103 Id. ¶ 250–52.
104 On this point see the criticism of Pinar Akman & Luke Garrod, When Are Excessive Prices
Unfair? 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 403, 425.
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the city of Helsingborg, if it had used the land of the port for different
purposes.105
Second, the Commission discussed opportunity costs in its decision on the
Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext merger.106 The EC prohibited the proposed
merger between the two companies—operating the two largest exchanges for
ﬁnancial derivatives in the world—because of its harmful effects on the sub-
market for European ﬁnancial derivatives. The Commission found that the
companies held a signiﬁcant market share on this submarket. Hence, the pro-
posed merger was blocked on the grounds that it would create a quasi-
monopoly in European ﬁnancial derivatives traded globally on exchanges that
would, in turn, lead to signiﬁcant harm to derivative users and the European
economy. The case largely turned on the issue of market deﬁnition, and in par-
ticular whether over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives (made directly between
two investors) and exchange-traded derivatives (ETDs) were part of the same
market. The Commission disagreed with the assertion of the notifying parties
that OTCs and ETDs belonged in the same market and found that they do not
compete with each other. It concluded that ETDs typically amount to around
€100,000 per trade and are standardised whereas OTC derivatives amount to
around €200 m and are customised to meet buyer and seller requirements.
The Commission thus focused its analysis on the ETDs markets where parties
found to have a combined market share of 90 percent.
The opportunity costs were considered in several stages of the reasoning
process. First, in the course of the market deﬁnition of ETDs. In calculating
the trading cost of ETDs the Commission did not only refer to the explicit ele-
ments of such a transaction (that is, membership fees as well as per transaction
clearing and trading fees) but also to the implicit elements such as the realised
bid-ask spread, the market impact and the opportunity cost of posting collat-
eral.107 Also, in establishing whether a link exists between trading and clearing
services.108 Finally, in the assessment stage of the parties’ proposed remedies
addressing the Commission’s concerns. One of the efﬁciency claims put
forward by the notifying parties to the transaction related to the collateral
savings that would arise in the case the proposed merger was approved. The
Commission argued that such savings do not represent actual efﬁciencies for
clearing members. This is because the relevant metric in quantifying efﬁciency
as a cost saving is the opportunity cost. The Commission argued that it “is not
105 Scandlines, supra note 101, ¶ 209, 234–35; Sundbusserne, supra note 101, ¶ 185, 209–10. This
was rejected in subsequent costs calculations, not because this was inaccurate, but because the
costs for the city should not be taken into account as costs for the port authority HHAB.
Scandlines, supra note 101, ¶ 211; Sundbusserne, supra note 101, ¶ 187.
106 Case COMP/M. 6166 [2011], Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext Merger (Brussels, 1 February
2012) at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6166_20120201_20610_
2711467_EN.pdf.
107 Id. ¶ 229, 501.
108 Id. ¶ 237–43.
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the collateral savings but the opportunity cost of holding cash or securities
posted as collateral which is the relevant measure of actual cost savings from
lower collateral requirements.”109 Grouping together collateral cost savings
estimates with other cost savings such as IT and user access cost savings, as the
parties did, was found inappropriate, as the opportunity cost of holding cash or
collateral, rather than collateral savings as such determine the actual cost
savings for the customers.110
Finally, in the Telefónica decision,111 issued against the Spanish telecommu-
nications incumbent for alleged margin squeeze between its national and re-
gional wholesale charges to its broadband network and its retail prices for
broadband access, the Commission took into account opportunity costs when
deﬁning the relevant wholesale markets. In particular, the Commission
resorted to the opportunity cost analysis in order to assess the substitutability
between the regional wholesale offer and the national wholesale offers. It
argued that, contrary to Telefónica’s submissions regarding the substitutability
of these two offers, switching from a regional to a national wholesale offer
would make little economic sense. This is because operators that had already
invested in the roll-out of a regional network to connect with the different
access points would be unlikely to “bear the opportunity cost of not using their
network and use a national wholesale offer which does not allow them the
same possibilities in terms of control over the quality of service of the retail
product as the regional wholesale offer.”112
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have presented a novel legal approach to the assessment of
margin squeeze conduct. We showed that assessing margin squeeze conducts
through an above-cost predatory pricing standard, which (1) includes oppor-
tunity costs due to missed upstream sales in the price-cost test and (2) requires
the margin squeeze conduct to be exclusionary, could minimize both the risks
of over- and under-deterrence. This could, in turn, reduce the gap between
current U.S. and EU antitrust stances on this issue. We have also explained
why the intrinsic speciﬁcities of vertically related markets in which margin
squeezes take place overcome classic concerns about antitrust assessment of
above-cost predation. Finally, we have provided a discussion of the relevant
case law and decision practice supporting our approach.
One could possibly consider further extensions to our approach. For in-
stance, our analysis focuses on cases where there is a duty to deal that is
enforced by courts. This includes a regulatory duty to deal in the EU, but not
in the U.S. A natural extension of our analysis would thus be to consider the
109 Id. ¶ 1190.
110 Id. ¶ 1190–92.
111 See supra note 42.
112 Id. ¶ 187.
178 Journal of Competition Law& Economics
 by guest on M
arch 19, 2016
http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
case of margin squeeze when there is no such duty to deal enforced by the
Courts.113 Furthermore, our economic analysis builds on the case of homoge-
neous markets. In differentiated markets, the evaluation of the opportunity
costs deriving from a margin squeeze strategy would imply calculating ﬁrms’
products diversion ratios. This task, for instance, is undertaken by competition
authorities in merger analysis.114 A full characterization of margin squeeze in
differentiated markets would then provide useful in such circumstances.
Finally, while including opportunity costs in the assessment of a margin
squeeze conduct is relatively simple when the dominant ﬁrm is vertically inte-
grated (as in our analysis), it may still invite the broader question of which cost
measure and base should be analyzed under antitrust laws.
113 See Steven C. Salop, Refusals to Deal and Price Squeezes by an Unregulated, Vertically Integrated
Monopolist, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 709 (2010); Bouckaert & Verboven, supra note 66 (offering a
presentation of the relevant issues in this setting).
114 See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: Let’s Tell the Whole Story, 17
ANTITRUST MAG. 49 (2003); Jullien, Rey & Saavedra, supra note 68, at 30 (discussing the
AEC test, including the diversion ratio).
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